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Abstract 
This paper analyses the long-run growth rates of advanced economies, based on 
demographic factors. To this end, growth is broken down into two components: 
growth in productivity (GDP per working-age person) and the projected rate of 
growth of the working-age population. Productivity is assumed to grow in the long-
run at a constant rate equal to that of the technology leader, whereas the 
demographic projections are those of the United Nations. This simple methodology 
abstracts from other factors normally considered in the literature on long-term 
growth, such as the convergence process (we focus on advanced economies) and 
heterogeneity in participation and employment rates. However, the results do not 
differ much from those obtained using these other approaches (which are richer, 
but also more speculative), although the growth rates turn out to be somewhat 
lower in most cases. They indicate a general deceleration of growth in advanced 
economies in the coming two decades, due to a slowdown in working-age 
population growth. Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain face the least favourable 
growth dynamics in our sample, as these countries face reductions in the size of 
their workforces. By 2050 France and the United Kingdom could have overtaken 
Germany to become the largest economies in Europe. In the case of Spain (whose 
working-age population is expected to peak in 2024) the growth rate of GDP will 
progressively decline to just below 2% over the following decade. 
Keywords: Advanced economies, demography, convergence, endogenous growth. 
JEL classification: E20, O40, O50. 
 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este documento analiza las tasas de crecimiento de largo plazo para una muestra 
representativa de economías avanzadas, sobre la base de las perspectivas 
demográficas. Para ello, se descompone el crecimiento del PIB en dos factores: el 
crecimiento de la productividad (definida como PIB por persona en edad de trabajar) 
y el crecimiento de la población en edad de trabajar. En particular, se supone una 
tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo de la productividad constante e igual a la del líder 
tecnológico, y para la población se toman las proyecciones demográficas de 
Naciones Unidas. Esta metodología sencilla no tiene en cuenta otros factores 
utilizados en la literatura del crecimiento de largo plazo, tales como los procesos de 
convergencia –por lo que este documento se centra exclusivamente en economías 
avanzadas– o la heterogeneidad en la participación y las tasas de empleo. Sin 
embargo, los resultados de este trabajo no difieren mucho de otros estudios 
basados en un conjunto más amplio de supuestos. En todo caso, los resultados 
apuntan a una disminución generalizada del crecimiento en las economías avanzadas 
durante las próximas dos décadas, debido a un descenso del crecimiento de la 
población en edad de trabajar. Japón, Alemania, Italia y España son los países de  
la muestra analizada que se enfrentan a los escenarios demográficos más adversos, 
con reducciones de su fuerza laboral. En el caso de la economía española se espera 
que el crecimiento de la población en edad de trabajar (la cual alcanzaría su máximo 
en 2024) se ralentice, lo que posiblemente contribuirá, de manera progresiva, a 
reducir la tasa de crecimiento del PIB a largo plazo (situándose ligeramente por 
debajo del 2% en la próxima década). Hacia el año 2050, el tamaño de las 
economías de Francia y Reino Unido podría haber sobrepasado al de  Alemania. 
Palabras clave: economías avanzadas, demografía, convergencia, crecimiento 
endógeno. 
Códigos JEL: E20, O40, O50. 
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1 Introduction 
What is the long-run growth rate of advanced economies? The sustained period of 
growth that most advanced countries experienced in the 2000s came to an end 
with the economic crisis that began in 2008. Since then, policymakers and analysts 
alike have focused on how to solve the different challenges posed by the crisis in 
order to ensure a return to a sustainable growth path for these economies. 
However, regardless of the importance of the current problems, it is essential to 
have a clear perspective of the medium and long-run challenges that advanced 
economies will face in the coming two decades, as an adequate diagnosis is 
necessary to begin implementing the right measures today. 
In particular, as will be made clear in this paper, many advanced economies 
are entering a new phase of economic development characterised first by a 
slowdown and then by a decline of their working-age populations. Some countries 
such as Japan have been coping with this reality for the last two decades, whereas 
others such as Spain will face it in the coming years. Therefore, advanced 
economies should be ready to face a future characterised by slower GDP growth 
rates than in the past.  
It may be argued that the main priority of policymakers should be the rate of 
per capita GDP growth instead of the total GDP growth, as citizens are only 
concerned about the growth in their own income. This assumption may be true in 
general terms, but there are several risks associated with low output growth. In the 
first place, a reduction in the aggregate growth rate has direct effects on the 
sustainability of public and private debt, which depends crucially on the growth rate 
of aggregate output. A slowdown in the growth rate, ceteris paribus, would make 
debt service more difficult by overburdening a stable or decreasing working-age 
population.  
In the second place, a reduction in the working-age population and slower 
output growth may reinforce each other via migratory flows. Slower growth typically 
reduces immigration as there are fewer job opportunities available, reducing the size 
of the workforce and thus the growth potential of the economy. This negative 
feedback effect may adversely affect the price of assets such as housing, due to a 
steady reduction in demand. A protracted fall in housing prices may have important 
consequences in terms of the balance sheets of households and financial 
institutions. 
Finally, policymakers could mistake this structural reduction in growth  
– which is the consequence of demographic trends – for a temporary fall due to the 
current business cycle. If policymakers erroneously estimate the output gap to be 
greater than its actual value, they may implement expansionary policies that could 
be counterproductive. Although we do not explicitly explore those effects in this 
paper, they are important since they highlight why the question that we pose – the 
magnitude of the long-run growth rate – is so relevant to the current design of public 
policies. 
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In order to assess the growth potential of advanced economies, in section 2 
we briefly sketch what the historical data and economic theory tell us about the 
long-run growth potential of the various countries. In particular, it highlights how the 
long-run growth rate of GDP per working-age person of advanced countries 
converges with that of the technology leader, the United States. Therefore, the 
difference among countries in the long-run depends mainly on their demographic 
trends. The demographic projections for advanced economies are analysed in detail 
in section 3.1 We conclude that Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain are four countries 
that face more challenging demographic prospects, whereas other countries, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, enjoy a more favourable 
demographic future.  
The main results of this paper are presented in section 4. We show how, on 
average, advanced economies will lose more than 1 percentage point of annual 
growth in the decade 2012-2021 compared to 1998-2007. In the period 2012-
2031, the long-run growth rate is computed to be 1.7%, compared to 2.9% in the 
period 1988-2007, due mainly to a change from a positive to a negative trend in the 
growth rate of the working-age population. The heterogeneity of the demographic 
projections will affect the relative size of the economies, and by 2050 France and the 
United Kingdom could have overtaken Germany to become the largest economies 
in Europe. In the case of Spain (whose working-age population is expected to peak 
in 2024) the growth rate of GDP will progressively decline to just below 2% over the 
following decade. 
Section 5 compares our exercise with similar recent exercises and explains 
the differences in assumptions and results among them. Exercises that incorporate 
convergence elements provide a somewhat less dramatic picture than ours, but at 
the cost of introducing a higher degree of judgment and, thus, subjectivity. It also 
shows how our measure of long-term growth resembles measures of historical 
potential output growth. Finally, section 6 concludes by summarising the main 
arguments in the article. 
                                                                          
1. These projections are taken from the United Nations Population Division database. 
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2 Economic growth in the long-run 
At the beginning of the 19th century a number of countries, led by the United 
Kingdom, experienced an increase in the growth rate of its output per working-age 
person. This reflected the transition from a traditional to a capitalist economy due to 
the Industrial Revolution. In the 20th century, the United States took up the role of 
the technology leader from the United Kingdom. Since then, the growth rate of the 
GDP per working-age person in the United States has fluctuated around a constant 
value of 1.7 percent. Despite the fluctuations, the trend growth has been quite 
stable: the logarithm of the GDP per capita in 2000 could have been forecasted with 
a small error if we had drawn a straight line using data from 1950 to 1965, as shown 
in figure 1.  
Figure 1: Historical evolution of the logarithm GDP  
 
This empirical fact was first explained by the neoclassical economic 
literature such as Solow (1956). Provided that returns to scale in labor and capital 
were decreasing, the long-run (“steady-state”) growth rate of per capita GDP is 
equal to the growth rate of the so-called total factor productivity (TFP). It means that, 
as long as the marginal product of building more factories or employing more people 
in each of the existing factories is decreasing, per capita income growth will depend 
solely on the growth rate of technology. As the “exogeneity” of the TFP was not 
quite satisfying as a theory, the “endogenous growth literature” was able to explain 
the process of technological innovation as the result of the working of researchers 
and entrepreneurs who produce new technological breakthroughs in order to 
capture some monopolistic rents.2 This literature explained the long-run growth rate 
of technology as a function of the diverse barriers to entrepreneurship and the 
productivity of research and development (R&D) efforts. 
What about the growth rate of the rest of the countries in the World? Here a 
distinction should be made between advanced and developing countries. In the 
case of advanced countries, their GDP per capita have been converging in the 20th 
century to parallel growth paths (linear in logarithms), as shown in figure 1. This 
convergence was not a homogeneous process. In the case of some countries, such 
as Germany or France, it began in the 19th century and, despite being interrupted 
                                                                          
2. See, for example, Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
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(and temporarily reverted) by the two World Wars, it continued throughout the 20th 
century until their growth paths were parallel to that of the U.S., that is, their mean 
growth rates were equal to 1.7 percent. In other countries, such as Japan or Spain, 
the process was accelerated in the post-war period and by the end of the century 
they seemed to have converged to parallel growth paths. 
The Solow model predicted this kind of economic convergence of countries. 
As a backward country begins to accumulate capital, its growth rate increases 
above that of the technological leader, however this growth effect progressively 
fades away as its per-capita capital gets closer to that of the leader. The problem 
was that the Solow model predicted not only a convergence in growth rates, but 
also a convergence in the levels of per-capital income, a feature not observed in the 
data where there are permanent income-level gaps between advanced countries. 
The new generation of endogenous growth models, such as the one by Howitt 
(2000), was able to explain also this fact as a result of the barriers to technology 
adoption between follower countries and the leader. In particular, the theory 
explained how, in the first stages of industrialization, a country is able to grow faster 
than the leader due to capital accumulation and technology adoption. After a certain 
time, these effects fade away and the country grows at the same rate than the 
technological leader (in terms of GDP per working-age population) despite the 
existence of a permanent gap in the level of income, which is the result of the 
barriers to technology adoption. In this model, structural reforms are able to reduce 
this gap in levels but cannot permanently increase the growth rate in the long-run.3 
The problem is more complex if we consider developing countries (i.e. those 
countries whose productivity growth rates have not converged to those of the 
technological leader). As discussed in Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), there 
seems to be no “catch-up” process in the poorest countries in the world. Therefore, 
developing countries could in principle be subdivided in two groups: those that are 
actually in the convergence process and those that are not.  Of course, some 
countries have moved from one group to the other in the last century (and 
sometimes they have switched sides several times) producing the so-called growth 
“miracles” and “disasters”. According to Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, even countries 
that are in a convergence path may converge to a growth rate below that of the 
advanced countries due to barriers to technology adaptation. The bottom line is that 
assessing the future growth rate of emerging countries is a more complex task than 
in advanced ones. 
Returning to the problem of assessing the growth potential of advanced 
countries, the previous discussion should have clarified that, in the long-run, it is 
very close to that of the technological leader. That is, over protracted periods of 
time, countries that have already converged to its long-run (“steady-state”) path 
should have growth rates of their GDP per working age population close to 1.7 
percent.4 To verify this, Figure 2 displays the histogram of annual growth rates of 
GDP per working-age population –defined as “productivity”- for a wide sample of 16 
                                                                          
3. However, structural reforms do increase the growth rate in the transition path from one income level to a higher one. 
4. It should be noticed that so far we have indistinctly used the notions of GDP per capita or per working-age population. 
These two values have been similar in the past for most countries, but they will differ in the future as population age and 
decline, which is one of the central points of this paper. Therefore, from now on we always refer to working-age 
population, which is the correct variable to analyze. 
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advanced economies5. The variance of the distribution is characterized by the 
volatility of the business cycles, whereas the mean is the average growth rate for this 
sample which is 1.7 percent. Therefore, economic theory predictions seem to be 
validated by the data of the last two decades, and the “productivity” of advanced 
economies can be confidently forecasted to grow, on average, at 1.7 percent.  
Figure 2: Historical distribution of GDP per working-age population across a sample 
of 16 advanced countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A constant productivity growth in the long run does not imply a constant 
GDP growth rate. As we discuss in the next section, the demographic projections 
for advanced economies yield a heterogeneous picture for the decades to come. 
This variability in the growth rate of the working-age populations will have a deep 
impact on GDP projections. 
                                                                          
5. The sample of countries chosen in this paper is composed by Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. These 
countries have been selected as a representative sample of advanced OECD economies. 
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3 Demographic projections 
In this section we carefully explain the source of demographic information and how 
projections are made. Projections about population should in principle be more 
reliable than about other issues, as they imply high levels of inertia. For example, 
most of the working-age population in 2025 has already been born.6 
Notwithstanding, the reassessment of migratory flows can sometimes make the 
demographic assessment more uncertain, so the projection should be taken with a 
grain of salt7, as explained below. 
The data for demographic projections has been obtained from the World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, developed by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division (henceforth UNPD), 
the main reference for demographic projections in social sciences. From this data 
set we obtain for each country in our sample yearly data on the total population 
aged 15-64 for the period 1950–2100.  
It is important to distinguish the differences in methodology between official 
population estimates and projections, since they determine the uncertainty 
surrounding our exercises. The official population estimates (period 1950-2010) are 
obtained by incorporating all new information regarding demographic dynamism of 
each country or geographic area in the past, while population projections (period 
2010-2100) are obtained by formulating some detailed assumptions about the 
future paths of fertility, mortality and international migration.  
Regarding projections, the starting point is the estimated population by the 
end of June 2010. Whenever this estimate is not available, the 2010 estimate is 
derived from the last population data available (obtained usually from a population 
census or a population register), which is projected to 2010 using all available 
information about the trends of fertility, mortality and international migration from that 
date to 1 July 2010. When data for the last 5 or 10 years are not available, 
projections are done based on the most recent available data in order to get the 
estimated demographic trends. In order to project population to 2100 the data set 
contains eight different projection variants which correspond to different 
assumptions regarding fertility, mortality and international migration (see Table 1 for 
a description of these different scenarios). 
 
 
                                                                          
6. Working-age population is typically defined as the number of people from 15 to 64 years old. 
7. Note that migrations tend to be procyclical, so that current projections made at a certain time period can be 
influenced by the cyclical situation, introducing uncertainty or volatility in the recurrent forecasts. For instance, in periods 
of intense expansion, where immigration is high, the recent trends of migration could be extrapolated into the future, 
leading to an overestimation of future flows. 
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Table 1: Projection variants in terms of assumptions for fertility, mortality and 
international migration 
 
In this paper, in order to remain neutral regarding the future evolution of 
these three variables, we use the medium fertility variant. This scenario assumes 
medium-fertility, and normal mortality and international migration. The medium 
fertility assumption is based on the assumption that the evolution of fertility 
includes three broad phases: (i) a high-fertility pre-transition phase (phase I); (ii) 
the fertility transition itself (phase II) and (iii) a low-fertility post-transition phase 
(phase III, during which fertility probably fluctuates close to replacement level, or 
converges towards it).8  
The normal-mortality assumption is based on the models for life expectancy 
changes developed by UNPD, taking into account recent trends in life expectancy 
by gender, and allowing for the impact of pandemics such as the HIV.  
Finally, regarding the normal-migration assumption, short-run projections are 
based on recent experience and on political views on the subject at the country 
level. These numbers are then kept constant over the next decades. After mid-
century it is assumed to gradually decline to zero until 2100.  
Table 2 summarizes for our sample of countries the UNPD projections for 
working-age population. The information displayed includes the year in which the 
maximum level of working-age population is achieved in each country, the ratio 
between working-age population in 2027 and working-age population today, and 
the ratio between working-age population in 2027 and its maximum level. It is 
important to distinguish between two set of countries. Firstly, those countries with 
an increasing working-age population over the whole or most of the period of 
analysis. These countries are Australia, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, and the US (in all these countries the maximum working-age population is 
not reached before 2100), Canada (reaching the maximum working-age population 
                                                                          
8. Other assumptions about the future trends of fertility formulated by the UNPD are the high-fertility assumption, where 
fertility remains at a level 0.5 children above the fertility in the medium variant over most of the projection period; the low-
fertility assumption, where fertility remains at a level 0.5 children below the fertility in the medium variant over most of the 
projection period; the constant-fertility assumption, where, for each country, fertility remains constant at the estimated 
level for the period 2005-2010 and finally, the instant-replacement assumption, where fertility is set for each country to 
the necessary level to ensure a net reproduction rate of 1 from the period 2010-2015. For more detailed information 
about the assumptions formulated by the UNPD regarding the future paths of fertility, mortality and international 
migration see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011b). World Population 
Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables. 
 
Projection variant Fertility Mortality
International 
Migration
Low fertility Low Normal Normal
Medium fertility Medium Normal Normal
High fertility High Normal Normal
Constant-fertility Constant as of 2005-2010 Normal Normal
Instant-replacement-fertility Instant-replacement as of 2010-2015 Normal Normal
Constant-mortality Medium Constant as of 2005-2010 Normal
No change Constant as of 2005-2010 Constant as of 2005-2010 Normal
Zero-migration Medium Normal Zero as of 2010-15
Source: United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revis ion )
Projection variants in terms of assumptions for fertility, mortality and international migration
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in 2078), France (reaching the maximum working-age population in 2099), and the 
UK (reaching the maximum working-age population in 2048). A second set of 
countries have a less favorable demographic evolution. Among them, some have 
already reached peak working-age population levels: Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan 
and the Netherlands. Another country, Spain, will reach this peak in 2024, after 12 
years of very slow growth (notice that working age population in 2027 will be very 
similar to that of 2012, and at the same time, there is also little difference between 
working age population in 2027 and its peak in 2024).  
Table 2: Demographic projections for the sample of countries 
 
This heterogeneity translates into a very different situation in a 15 year 
period. In 2027 working-age population are expected to decrease in Germany and 
Japan (11 percent), Finland (7 percent), and Italy and the Netherlands (5 percent). 
On the other hand, the largest increases in working-age population would be in 
Australia and Ireland (10 percent), Iceland (8 percent), New Zealand (7 percent), and 
the U.S. (4 percent). In other words, there will be a difference of 21 percentage 
points on the relative working age population of the countries with the most and 
least favorable demographic evolution in 2027 relative to today, something that, as 
we will see, will condition dramatically their relative economic performance.  
It is also important to understand the speed at which working-age 
population will either converge or diverge to/from peak levels. Figure 3 tries to 
capture this dynamic behavior by plotting the evolution of working-age population 
15 years before and after peak levels. All countries are lined up at peak levels and 
the cross mark in each line represents the current year (2012). Working-age 
populations are normalized to be 100 at peak levels and the legend shows the year 
where peak working-age population is reached. The figure reflects the evolution of 
working-age population for the four countries that face some of the most 
challenging demographic projections, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. As it is 
shown, the four countries follow similar demographic trends, with Japan being the 
pioneer country in the demographic transition. 
Demographic 
projections
Maximum working-
age population 
year
Working-age 
population 2027/ 
Working-age 
population 2012
Working-age 
population 2027/ 
Maximum working-
age population
Australia 2100 110 85
Canada 2078 101 90
Finland 2010 93 92
France 2099 100 92
Germany 1997 89 86
Iceland 2100 108 90
Ireland 2100 110 84
Italy 2010 95 95
Japan 1995 89 81
Netherlands 2010 95 95
New Zealand 2100 107 89
Norway 2100 103 87
Spain 2024 101 100
Sweden 2100 101 95
United Kingdom 2047 103 98
United States 2100 104 81
Source: United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revis ion )
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Figure 3: Dynamic trend of the population age 15-64 (normalized to 100 the year of 
the maximum) 
 
An important message is that, although Spain still has 12 years of slightly 
favorable demographics, once the maximum level of working-age population is 
reached in 2024 the slope will be much steeper. In other words, working-age 
population in Spain after 2024 will decrease at rates similar to those experienced by 
Japan after 1995, rates much faster than those of Germany after 1997 or Italy 
currently. Again, this ingredient will be important to understand the messages 
contained in the next section. 
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 Working-age 
population
Observed 
GDP
Long-term 
GDP
 Working-age 
population
Observed 
GDP
Long-term 
GDP
Working-age 
population
Observed 
GDP
Long-term 
GDP
 Working-age 
population
Observed 
GDP
Long-term 
GDP
 Working-age 
population
Long-term 
GDP
 Working-age 
population
Long-term 
GDP
Australia 1.7 2.9 3.5 1.3 3.3 3.0 1.5 3.6 3.2 1.6 2.8 3.3 0.7 2.4 0.6 2.3
Canada 1.4 3.1 3.2 1.1 2.2 2.8 1.3 3.3 3.0 0.9 0.9 2.6 0.2 1.9 0.0 1.7
Finland 0.5 3.5 2.2 0.2 1.8 1.9 0.3 3.7 2.0 0.1 -0.7 1.8 -0.6 1.1 -0.3 1.4
France 1.0 2.1 2.7 0.3 2.1 2.0 0.6 2.3 2.3 0.3 0.1 2.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7
Germany 0.7 1.9 2.4 0.3 2.7 2.1 -0.2 1.6 1.5 -0.3 0.3 1.4 -0.6 1.1 -1.2 0.5
Iceland 1.4 4.3 3.2 1.1 1.2 2.8 1.5 4.7 3.2 1.6 -1.5 3.4 0.6 2.3 0.4 2.1
Ireland 1.1 3.0 2.8 1.2 6.2 2.9 2.0 6.7 3.7 0.8 -2.5 2.5 0.6 2.3 0.7 2.4
Italy 0.9 2.7 2.6 0.0 1.9 1.7 0.1 1.5 1.8 0.3 -0.9 2.0 -0.3 1.4 -0.6 1.1
Japan 0.9 4.2 2.6 0.4 2.9 2.1 -0.4 1.2 1.3 -0.8 -0.4 0.8 -0.9 0.8 -0.7 1.0
Netherlands 1.2 1.8 2.9 0.6 3.1 2.3 0.4 2.6 2.1 0.1 0.3 1.8 -0.2 1.5 -0.6 1.1
New Zealand 1.2 2.0 2.9 1.3 2.1 3.0 1.4 3.3 3.1 0.9 1.2 2.7 0.5 2.2 0.3 2.0
Norway 0.6 3.5 2.4 0.5 3.2 2.3 0.9 2.4 2.6 1.2 0.5 2.9 0.2 1.9 0.2 1.9
Spain 1.1 2.0 2.8 0.7 2.8 2.4 1.2 3.8 3.0 0.7 -0.2 2.4 0.2 1.9 -0.2 1.5
Sweden 0.3 2.3 2.0 0.4 1.4 2.1 0.6 3.4 2.3 0.5 0.3 2.3 0.0 1.7 0.2 1.9
United Kingdom 0.5 2.3 2.2 0.1 2.3 1.9 0.7 2.9 2.4 0.5 -0.4 2.2 0.2 1.9 0.1 1.8
United States 1.1 3.1 2.8 1.0 3.0 2.7 1.3 3.0 3.0 0.7 0.6 2.4 0.4 2.1 0.2 1.9
Average 1.0 2.8 2.7 0.7 2.6 2.4 0.8 3.1 2.5 0.6 0.0 2.3 0.1 1.8 -0.1 1.7
Sources: United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision ) and World Bank
2012-2021 2022-2031
Growth rate (%)
1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 2008-2011
4 Growth projections 
In this section we integrate the insights from the previous two in order to construct 
GDP growth forecasts for our sample of advanced economies. These growth 
forecasts are constructed by combining the demographic projections of United 
Nations for the working-age population (15-64) with a productivity trend based on a 
constant growth rate of 1.7 percent: 
∆ logሺݕ௧ሻ ൎ ∆ logሺ݈௧ሻ ൅ ∆ logሺݔ௧ሻ ൌ0.017 ൅ ∆ logሺ݈௧ሻ, 
where ∆ logሺݕ௧ሻ is the growth rate of GDP, ∆ logሺ݈௧ሻ is the growth rate of working-
age population and ∆ logሺݔ௧ሻ is the growth rate of “productivity” defined as ݔ௧ ؠ ௬೟௟೟ . 
Table 3 displays the results.9 We group the historical data in four grouped-
columns: the first three include the three decades to 1978 to 2007 and the fourth 
one the crisis period 2008-2011. We provide the mean growth rates of working-age 
population and GDP observed in the data as well as a counterfactual “long-term” 
GDP growth defined as the GDP growth in the case of a constant growth rate of 
productivity of 1.7 percent. The last two columns provide information about our 
forecast of this “long-term” GDP. The last row displays the simple average across 
countries, not weighted by GDP or population. 
Table 3: Observed and long-run GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two results should be highlighted. The first one is the growth deceleration to 
be expected in the coming decades on average. In the last three decades prior to 
the crisis (1978-2007), the average growth rate of GDP was of 2.9 percent, slightly 
above the long-run one of 2.5 percent. This growth was the result of a robust 
population growth of 0.8 percent plus the productivity growth (observed 2.1, 
potential 1.7). In the two decades to come, these population growth is expected to 
halt (average 0 percent) thus inducing a growth rate of GDP of 1.7 percent. This 
implies that policymakers in advanced economies should be ready to face a growth 
                                                                          
9. Historical GDP data comes from the World Bank WDI database, at constant prices. 
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loss of more than 1 percent from the pre-crisis due solely to demographic 
considerations. 
The second one is the heterogeneity in the deceleration. The countries more 
affected by the demographic slowdown are Finland, Germany, Japan, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain. In these countries the average growth rate will be 1.2 
percent, half the 2.4 percent rate of the decade 1998-2007. In contrast, the less 
affected countries are Australia, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. In these countries growth is expected to be 2.2 percent, also 
below the 4.0 percent of the pre-crisis decade. 
Figure 4 displays the annual comparison between observed and long-run 
GDP growth (both historical and projected) for a subsample of countries. We 
observe how, in general, long-run GDP tracks the average value of the data in a 
similar way as statistical devices, such as moving average or low-pass filters, 
would do. 
Figure 4: Comparison between observed and long-run GDP for a subsample of 
countries 
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In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, we observe how 
the long-run GDP growth is expected to slightly decline in the coming decade, but it 
will be close to 2 percent, still above the productivity rate. In the case of Japan, 
which is of particular interest as it was the first country in the world to experience the 
demographic shock, the long-run growth rate has been falling since the early 1990s 
and it was 1.3 percent in the pre-crisis decade, close to the observed 1.2 percent. 
In the coming two decades this rate will continue falling until a minimum of 0.8, to 
slightly recover afterwards. A similar picture emerges in the case of Germany, where 
the long-run rate was 1.5 in the pre-crisis and will continue falling until 0.5 percent. 
Italy, despite the disappointing evolution of its observed GDP before the crisis 
compared to the long-run trend, is expected to decelerate until a growth of 1.1 
percent in the decade 2022-2031. In the case of Spain, the robust pre-crisis growth 
was fuelled by a sustained growth in its working-age population (1.2 percent) due to 
the immigration surge in the 2000s plus a growth of productivity of 2.5 percent, well 
above the 1.7, helped by a convergence process to the technology frontier –and, as 
we know by large increase in private debt. It should be remarked again that our 
notion of productivity (i.e. GDP per working person) includes not only TFP but also 
capital per capita, and improvements in labor participation and employment.  
Looking at the future, the decade 2012-2021 yields an expected grow rate of 1.9 
percent, due to the reduced population growth of 0.2. Shortly after (2024) the 
projected working population peak is reached, reducing further long-run growth 
rates, to 1.5 percent in the period 2022 to 2031. 
Finally, Table 4 displays the projected size (relative to the US economy) of 
the largest 9 advanced countries in 2012, 2052 and 2100. The projection is taken 
assuming that from 2012 onwards countries grow at an average rate equal to their 
long-run rate. Two features should be remarked. The first is the reduction of the size 
of the countries compared to the United States. For example, the Japanese 
economy, which represents almost 30 percent of the U.S. economy nowadays, is 
forecasted to be less than 17 percent in 2052. The second is the decline of 
Germany, Italy and Spain, three of the countries with more adverse demographic 
scenarios. In particular, Germany is forecasted to lose its dominant position as the 
largest economy in Europe, being overtaken by both France and the United 
Kingdom. Italy and Spain will both be smaller than Canada in 2052. 
Table 4: Relative size of the nine largest (today-) advanced economies 
Countries Long-term GDP Countries Long-term GDP Countries Long-term GDP
United States 100.0 United States 100.0 United States 100.0
Japan 28.2 Japan 16.8 Japan 13.3
Germany 20.2 United Kingdom 13.9 France 12.4
United Kingdom 15.5 France 13.0 United Kingdom 12.2
France 14.7 Germany 13.0 Germany 11.2
Italy 12.4 Canada 8.5 Canada 7.9
Spain 9.7 Italy 8.4 Italy 7.3
Canada 9.2 Spain 7.2 Australia 6.0
Australia 6.0 Australia 6.3 Spain 5.8
Note: GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $) of World Bank is used for this exercise.
Sources: United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision ) and World Bank
2012 2052 2100
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5 Comparison with other analysis 
To understand the relevance of our results it is important to compare them with 
those of recent studies addressing similar issues. A first set of papers allow for some 
convergence in variables such as human and physical capital stocks among these 
countries, while at the same time taking into account future demographics. It is 
important to highlight that our exercise does not consider further convergence in the 
long run, which potentially can generate important differences in the results, as we 
will show below. Table 5 summarizes the results for all this exercises, including ours. 
It displays the average growth rate for the period 2030 and 2050. 
Table 5: Comparison with other studies 
  
 A first exercise that allows for convergence is Ward (2011) in order to 
highlight the difference in growth prospects between developed and emerging 
economies due to this force and the different demographic projections. The authors 
use growth regressions to estimate the importance of convergence forces and then 
(in their preferred exercise) assume that laggards converge to leaders in terms of the 
usual variables of growth regressions.  
Duval and Maisonneuve (2010) also allow for converge, but this time using a 
growth accounting framework. In particular, they allow countries to (slowly) converge 
to the top levels of education and physical capital while allowing some transition 
dynamics and heterogeneity in participation and unemployment rates. They also 
assume convergence in the TFP, but it does to the average growth rate of high TFP 
economies (which is 1.5 percent in their data). 
As can be seen in the first and fourth  columns of Table 5, these two 
exercises reduce the growth rate of the technological leader (and in some case that 
of the most advanced economies), while they give an extra kick to those economies 
that lag further behind in terms of education and physical capital, such as Ireland or 
Spain. 
Potential GDP           
Duval and de la 
Maisonneuve (2010)
Potential GDP OECD
Potential GDP           
Merola and Sutherland    
(2012)
Potential GDP  HSBC Long-term GDP
Australia 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.6 2.1
Canada 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.6 2.0
Finland 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.6
France 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8
Germany 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.0
Ireland 2.4 2.2 1.8 2.1 1.9
Italy 1.5 1.5 0.8 1.8 0.9
Japan 0.9 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.6
Netherlands 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.4
Norway 1.7 2.0 n.a. 1.8 1.9
Spain 1.6 1.2 1.0 2.3 0.9
Sweden 1.9 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.8
United Kingdom 1.9 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.8
United States 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2
2030- 2050
Growth rate (%)
Sources: Duval and de la Maisonneuve (2010), OECD,  Merola and Sutherland (2012), HSBC, United Nations Population Division and World Bank
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OECD (2012) differentiates from Duval and Maisonneuve (2010) by allowing 
for more heterogeneity in participation and unemployment rates and by removing 
convergence in participation rates. At the same time, it lowers TFP growth of the 
leaders to 1.3 percent (see column two of Table 5). The results are, on average, 
more pessimistic than those of column two. And this is particularly the case for 
countries where participation rates today are well below best practices. 
Finally, Merola and Sutherland (2012) just differ with us on allowing some 
dynamics on employment and participation rates until 2025, that is, they use the 
OECD Medium Term scenarios for employment and participation rates until 2025 
and then assume they remain constant from that year onwards. For productivity 
they take the same scenarios until 2025, and after this date they assume 
convergence to the rate of the technological leader from 2025 to 2035. After 2035 
productivity growth rates are assumed to remain constant at that level. As a 
consequence, their results do not differ that much from ours (see column three of 
Table 5), particularly in the period of comparison. 
To sum up, the differences in results with our approach derive from the 
nature of our exercise. Our approach is more neutral than the ones described 
above. We avoid dealing with employment and participation rates given the elevated 
uncertainty around the future evolution of these variables due to the particularities of 
the current situation. Although, as the comparison with Merola and Sutherland 
(2012) shows, this does not seem to be a key issue since there are no major 
differences between their result and ours.  
More importantly, we abstract from convergence issues since we do not 
believe these are going to be important. As we have argued above, most of the 
convergence in growth rates seems to have already happened. Moreover, modeling 
this requires taking a stand on the evolution of structural policies in the future for 
each country, and on the degree of convergence in stocks of factor endowments. 
And small differences in assumptions generate large differences in results, as shown 
by the comparison of columns four, one and two of Table 5. 
It is true that, in general, exercises that take into account some of these 
convergence ingredients present a more favourable perspective due to the 
convergence in levels of capital (human or physical) or by allowing for larger TFP 
growth of laggard economies. But this is not necessarily always the case, since this 
factor may add or reduce growth. An example of this is the case of Germany when 
comparing columns 1 (Duval and Maisonneuve, 2010) and 2 (OECD, 2012) of Table 
5. And introducing convergence elements for advanced economies comes at the 
cost of making judgments which are not always easy to justify, adding subjectivity 
and speculation to the forecasts.  
To sum up, our results, which are based purely on demographics and 
assume convergence in productivity per worker should be interpreted with care, but 
they have the attractive of being a simple approach, with low degree of subjectivity. 
Furthermore, they do not differ much from other more convoluted approaches.  
They show that, other things equal, working-age demographic projections in the 
coming decades will be a driving force for a general slowdown of GDP growth. And, 
in terms of productivity growth there are 200 years of evidence that suggest (when 
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looking only at advanced economies that seem to have converged to the 
technological leader), that, very likely, things are going to stay equal. 
It is also interesting to compare our results with a measure of potential output, 
defined as the level of output that an economy can produce at a constant inflation 
rate.10 We select the OECD measure, which uses the production function approach, 
and we compare our results with potential output in “real time” (that is, the estimation 
in year t for potential output in the same year t) and the last series for potential output 
(covering also all previous years). Figure 5 contains this information for the U.S., United 
Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Germany and Italy, for the period 1996-2011. 
Figure 5: Comparison between long-run GDP and OECD potential output (real-time 
and last revision) 
 
The first thing to note is how different the two OECD series are. This is 
consequence of the end-point problem of potential output estimate (see Baxter and 
King, 1995). Although this is a problem mainly of estimates that use filtering approaches, 
it also affects estimates of the potential output using the production function that use 
filter techniques in order to detrend the inputs of the production function.  
                                                                          
10. This definition of potential output is not universal. It could, for instance, be also defined as the output in the case of 
no price stickiness in wages and prices. 
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It is also interesting to note that the difference between both series is more 
remarkable in the case of countries that experienced a large boom during the 
expansion period, Spain, United Kingdom and the US. We could interpret the 
difference between the actual OECD series for potential output growth and the 
OECD real time series as the error in the estimation in real time. Then it could be 
argued that those errors were large, particularly in countries with large booms, and 
especially at the height of the boom.  
On the other hand, if we compare these two measures with ours, our 
projections for long-run growth seem to behave more parsimoniously and tend to 
present an economic performance, during the expansion phase, which is in between the 
two OECD measures. That is, our measure of long term growth tracks more closely the 
final estimation of potential output growth when compared to the real time estimation.  
Finally we compare our exercise with the most recent projections of 
potential output available. Figure 6 shows the forecast for GDP growth and potential 
GDP growth, both from the last issue of the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, 
and our measure of long-term growth. 
Figure 6: Comparison between long-run GDP and IMF GDP forecasts of potential 
output (WEO) 
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 The main message from this Figure is that for most countries (all but Spain 
and Italy) our measure of long term growth closely tracks the estimations of potential 
output growth of the IMF11.  
All the previous analyses reinforce the confidence in the robustness of our 
forecasts. They are both consistent with the past measures of potential output and 
with the projections of future GDP growth.  
 
 
 
                                                                          
11. In the case of Spain, the differences are probably due to the large employment destruction and an intense increase 
in structural unemployment, which enter into the estimation of potential output, but do not affect the evolution of 
working-age population in the short run, which is the demographic factor in our approach. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the long-run growth rates of advanced economies. Growth 
rates are derived using only the growth in productivity (GDP per working-age 
person) and a demographic component. Productivity is assumed to grow in the 
long-run at a constant rate equal to that of the technology leader, an empirical 
regularity that, as we have argued, is very robust in the data. Our demographic 
projections come from widely used United Nations data.  
Our results indicate a general deceleration of growth in advanced 
economies in the coming two decades, due to a slowdown in population growth. 
Despite this general message, there is substantial heterogeneity among advanced 
economies. In the case of Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain the prospects are more 
negative, since these countries face reductions in the size of their workforces that 
will significantly reduce their growth.  
The immediate implication of this heterogeneity is that by 2050 the relative 
size of the GDP of these economies could change substantially, due to the 
heterogeneity of their demographic projections. In particular, France and the United 
Kingdom could have overtaken Germany to become the largest economies in 
Europe, while Spain will fall back in the ranking of nations in the sample, after its 
projected working-age population peaks in 2024. 
This new phase of economic development represents a very significant 
challenge for policymakers. The immediate challenge in the current context is that, 
with large public debts in most developed economies, a slowdown in the growth 
rate, ceteris paribus, will make debt servicing more difficult by overburdening a 
stable or decreasing working-age population. And of course, this will have an effect 
on the sustainability of public pension systems. But the expected demographic 
evolution also has implications for other key variables, such as housing prices and 
aggregate demand. Although we do not explicitly explore these effects in this paper, 
it is important to highlight them in order to explain why the question that we pose is 
so important for the current design of public policies. 
Finally, this paper has abstracted from emerging economies and 
convergence elements. Future work should include these elements, since taking into 
account the future evolution of developing economies may change the current map 
of economic dominance completely and, at the same time, that may help us to 
understand whether developed economies may obtain extra growth from these 
forces. We have discussed some exercises that try to do this, but we have argued 
that it comes at the cost of adding uncertainty, and that small differences in 
assumptions generate large differences in results.  
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